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ABSTRACT 
Identity theft has become one of the fastest growing crimes in America and stems 
from the widespread and growing reliance of organizations across the nation to use Social 
Security Numbers (SSN) as a primary personal identifier.  Originally intended for the 
very limited purpose of tracking social security benefits, the value of the SSN as a unique 
identifier was quickly recognized, and its use rapidly grew.  This “functionality creep” 
has led to the SSN becoming an almost de facto national ID number.  Employers, 
universities, credit agencies and financial institutions began using the SSN as a unique 
personal identifier.  The military started to use the SSN as a personal identifier in 1969 in 
place of the Military Serial Number.  Today, the SSN is used pervasively throughout the 
military, from personnel rosters to medical records, from administrative records to 
operational orders.  
This thesis analyzes the elimination of the SSN as the primary personal identifier 
within the Department of Defense and the Veterans’ Administration, replacing it with a 
Military Identification Number (MIN).  The elimination of the SSN at all but one critical 
location (pay related matters at the Defense Finance and Accounting System), would 
render all lost or stolen data useless to an identity thief.  A Cost/Benefit Analysis of the 
transition from SSN to MIN using six methods of analysis; payback period method, 
discounted payback period, benefit cost ratio, net present value, internal rate of return, 
and a probabilistic NPV were examined.  Each method’s benefits and drawbacks are 
discussed and the findings are summarized.  The CBA shows that the transition to a MIN 
is a cost effective solution with a Net Present Value that falls between $701 million and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Identity theft has become the fastest growing crime in America, affecting both the 
public as well as the private sector.  Organizations’ widespread and growing reliance on 
SSNs as identifiers has turned identity theft into a major crisis.  The recent theft of a 
Department of Veterans’ Administration (VA) computer containing a detailed database, 
the loss of detailed identification level data by a graduate school student, as well as 
instances of cracked databases including the theft of a LexisNexis database in 2005 all 
highlight the issue of protecting Americans from the identity theft. (Congressman Sam 
Farr) 
The crisis with identity theft stems from the widespread and growing reliance by 
organizations across the nation on Social Security Numbers (SSN).  After passage of the 
New Deal Social Security Program in 1936, the Social Security Administration started to 
assign the SSN.  Originally designed for the very limited scope of providing social 
security benefits, the value of the number as a unique personal identifier was quickly 
recognized and its use started to grow.  This “functionality creep” has led to the SSN 
becoming an almost de facto national ID number.  Employers, universities, credit 
agencies and financial institutions all started using the SSN as a unique personal 
identifier.  Even the military started to use the SSN as a personal identifier in 1969, 
replacing the Military Serial Number that had been previously used.  It was from this 
“functionality creep” that the seeds were sewn from which identity theft grew.  
Focusing on Government usage of the SSN, it is clear that reliance on this 
identifier is pervasive and the privacy safeguards that have been implemented to protect it 
are not making the “grade.” A recent report by the House Government Reform 
Committee graded government agencies’ information security procedures.  It found that 
eight government agencies received an “F” and four received “D” grades. Included in 
those agencies receiving the failing grade were the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (Committee on Government Reform 2006). 
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Still considered a relatively new phenomenon, a complete and universal definition 
of identity theft is not yet clear.  While clarity and understanding of the identity theft 
problem are still being developed, the sheer magnitude of the potential cost to society 
requires that the crisis be addressed. 
The DoD has reacted to the aforementioned incidents of data loss, and the 
resulting public and political pressure, by embarking on a path of increased security 
measures that run the gamut from encryption technologies to more restricted access and 
usage policies designed to reduce the possibility of personnel privacy data loss or theft.  
All of these measures, however, come with significant costs - both the real costs of the 
new technologies as well as productivity losses resulting from the more restricted usage 
policies.  However, despite all of these efforts, data losses continue to occur at a great 
cost to society. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze identity theft in the military that results 
from lost or stolen personal data, identify a primary solution for analysis, and then 
conduct a detailed Cost Benefit Analysis.  This study will follow a modified policy 
analysis format in order to more accurately identify the problem, as well as explore 
alternatives.  The thesis will then depart slightly from a true policy analysis in that only 
the primary alternative will be analyzed. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer several primary research questions as well as two 
secondary questions.  The multiple research questions are required to properly cover the 
breadth of this subject within one comprehensive thesis.  It is the comprehensive nature 
of the thesis that is unique to this study and is expected to provide the most value to the 
reader.  
The primary research questions are as follows: 
1.   Do SSNs remain a viable DoD personal identifier? 
2.   How pervasive is the use of SSNs throughout DoD? 




The secondary research questions are as follows: 
1.  What are the costs and benefits (both direct and indirect) associated with 
transitioning to a MIN? 
2.  What spillover effects would be associated with transitioning to a MIN? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The current political attention given to identity theft and particularly data losses 
from DoD and Government sources, has brought using the social security number as a 
personal identifier to the forefront of the nation’s consciousness.  Since individual 
branches of the military do not have the authority to issue their own identification 
number, this study will identify and evaluate the feasibility of a DoD wide policy change.  
Such a change would eliminate the use of the SSN as the primary personal identifier in 
favor of a military identification number.  This thesis is intended to aid policy makers in 
their decision process to evaluate the alternatives and make an informed decision 
regarding the primary personal identifier within the DoD.  
E. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will consist of an extensive policy analysis including the following:  
• A literature review 
• A legal and historical review of the laws governing the creation and use of 
the SSN 
• Development of alternatives, and 
• A cost benefit analysis.  
It is evident that there could be an infinite number of alternatives available for 
evaluation if the alternatives are based on varying degrees of security procedures and 
technological security measures (encryption, firewalls, etc.).  Therefore, the authors have 
chosen to base this thesis around two distinct alternatives, either the status quo, which 
includes the aforementioned technological and use restrictions or the replacement of the 
social security number with a Military Identification Number (MIN) as the primary 
personal identifier within the DoD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The thesis will be organized into six main chapters, including this introduction 
chapter, Chapter I.  Chapters II and III will include a literature review and will more 
completely identify the problem and its pervasiveness within DoD.  Chapter IV will then 
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look at alternatives to address the identity problem and fully develop the primary 
alternative. Chapter V is the main focus of the thesis, which is a cost benefit analysis of 
the primary alternative.  Finally, Chapter VI will summarize our findings and make 
recommendations.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPONSORED STUDIES ON IDENTITY 
THEFT 
1. Study by Javelin Strategy and Research 
In 2006, the Better Business Bureau (BBB) and Javelin Strategy and Research co-
released a study entitled 2006 Identity Fraud Survey Report as a longitudinal update to 
the Javelin 2005 Identity Fraud Survey Report and the Federal Trade Commission’s 2003 
Identity Theft Survey Report.  The 2006 report found that the number of identity fraud 
cases declined for the second year in a row, from 10.1 in 2003 to 8.9 million identity 
fraud victims in 2006.  (See Figure 1)  While the number of cases has declined, the dollar 
amount per case has risen to $6,383, a 21.6% increase since 2003. (BBB 2006)  Given the 
inverse relationship between cases and costs, the annual dollar cost of identity fraud has 
held at statistically the same level, $56.6 billion, since 2003. (BBB 2006)  The BBB 
report also showed the sources of identity theft (See Figure 2) and the average time spent 
by an identity theft victim seeking resolution increased from 33 hours in 2003 to 40 hours 




Figure 1.   Identity Fraud Volume (From: Javelin Strategy and Research ) 
 
 





2. Identity Theft Literature Review by Graeme R Newman and Megan 
M. McNally for the U.S. Department of Justice 
The study by Newman and McNally was funded by the U.S. Department of 
Justice and presented at the National Institute of Justice Focus Group Meeting held in 
January of 2005.  After defining the types of identity theft, Newman and McNally broke 
true identity theft into three distinct stages:  
• Stage 1: Acquisition of the identity.  During this stage the identity thief 
actually acquires the identity information, through whatever means 
necessary, to later use the identity information for subsequent gain. 
• Stage 2: Use of the identity information.  This stage includes accessing 
existing accounts, but can go much farther than that.  Identity thieves can 
open new credit accounts, commit insurance or tax fraud, or use the stolen 
identity in many other illegal ways.  This stage can take a long time to 
reach, as the identity thief carefully builds numerous credit accounts 
before ever tapping into them.  The thief then “cashes out” all at once 
before the crimes are discovered by the victim or the credit issuing 
agencies. 
• Stage 3: Discovery of the crime.  This stage can take a long time to reach 
as well, particularly by the victim of the identity theft.  Since the crime 
was probably conducted with new accounts established by the thief, the 
victim may not know about the crime until years later, particularly if the 
victim has not checked his credit report or has not recently applied for 
credit or a loan. 
The authors of the study point out the poor reporting record of identity theft 
victims.  Reported identity thefts vary significantly according to the demographics of the 
victim.  Older victims as well as lower income victims are less likely to report the crime 
at all.  On average, it is estimated that 38 percent of identity theft crimes go unreported. 
Furthermore, there is no central tracking system within the criminal justice system to 
catalog identity theft.  The Federal Trade Commission’s statistics on the number and 
extent of identity theft is based on consumer complaints and surveys that they have 
conducted, not on actual crime data from the Justice Department.  (Newman, McNally 
2005)  This type of data is characterized by non-response bias since it is survey data.  The 
survey data also suffers from the victims’ memories, their understanding of the crime and 
even their comprehension of the survey questions themselves. Victims may also be 
reluctant to fully answer the survey questions due to the private nature of the questions 
being asked.  Privacy crime victims are understandably reluctant to share private 
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information in survey answers.  Even the nature of randomly selected survey participants 
may be problematic, since identity theft victims may go to great lengths to remain 
“unseen” - keeping unlisted numbers, e-mail addresses, etc., which may prevent them 
from even being randomly selected to participate in the survey.  (Newman, McNally 
2005)    
The Newman/McNally study further suggests that future identity theft research 
should concentrate on the specific components of identity theft and the opportunity 
structure of each of those components.  (Newman, McNally 2005)  The study suggests 
that this research will lead to effective techniques to prevent identity theft; however, they 
also acknowledge that this approach simply leads to “something like an arms race,” 
where technology and other preventative measures work only until the thieves develop 
more sophisticated means to counter these preventative measures.  (Newman, McNally 
2005) 
This study categorizes the various types of victims as well as the types of identity 
theft crimes outlined above.  One particularly interesting category, especially for this 
thesis, is titled “institutional victims.”  The authors point out that certain groups of people 
may be more susceptible to identity theft crimes because of the group to which they 
belong to or their profession.  Specifically mentioned are students and members of the 
military due to the frequent use of their SSN for purposes other than those associated 
with the Social Security Administration.  Regarding military members, the following 
excerpt from the 2002 GAO study is offered: 
Members of the armed services may [also] be more susceptible than the 
general public to identity theft.  Given their mobility, service members 
may have bank, credit, and other types of accounts in more than one state 
and even overseas.  At times, service members may be deployed to 
locations far away from family members, which can increase their 
dependence on credit cards, automatic teller machines, and other remote-
access financial services (GAO 2002) 
3. Study by Federal Trade Commission 
In September 2003, the Federal Trade Commission released a report entitled 
Identity Theft Survey Report.  This survey was conducted by Synovate and can be 
considered the primary, definitive source of identity theft information within the United 
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States, particularly in regard to the victims of identity theft.  The objectives of the study 
were to estimate the incidence of identity theft victimization, measure the impact of 
identity theft on the victims, identify actions taken by the victims and explore measures 
that may help future victims of identity theft.  The study was conducted through 
telephone interviews of a random sample of US adults.  (FTC 2003) 
The study looked at incidents of identity theft and found that almost 10 million 
Americans had been the victims of identity theft within the previous year.  (FTC 2003)  
The total percentage of all types of identity theft victims within the previous five years 
amounted to 12.7% or 27.6 million people. 
This study breaks down identity theft into the following categories or types:  
• new accounts and other fraud 
• misuse of existing non-credit card account 
• misuse of existing credit card accounts  
The average cost of new accounts and other fraud associated with ID theft is estimated to 
be $10,200.  This equates to a $33 billion loss for this category of ID theft in the year 
prior to the study. (FTC 2003) 
The financial costs identified above are born by society as a whole; however, 
there are costs that the individual must directly bear.  For example, the average ID theft 
victim spends $500 correcting the resulting problems.  (FTC 2003)  Victims of “New 
Accounts and Other Frauds” crimes face average costs that are considerably higher at 
$1,200 each. For cases in the U.S., this totals $3.8 billion.  The resulting total cost to 
individuals in America amounts to $5.0 billion.  (FTC 2003) 
From a time lost perspective, the study showed that victims reported spending an 
average of about 30 hours to overcome the problems resulting from the identity theft and 
subsequent misuse of their personal information. (FTC 2003)  Victims of “New Accounts 
and Other Frauds” spent considerably more time correcting the problems, averaging 60 
hours each.  The median time spent correcting problems was substantially less, at 2 to 9 
hours.  When aggregated, Americans spent over 300 million hours trying to correct 
problems resulting from ID theft.  (FTC 2003) 
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4. Report by the Office of Management and Budget 
On March 1, 2006, OMB issued a report entitled the FY2005 Report to Congress 
on Implementation of The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.  The 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) was enacted in 2002 to, among 
other things, develop a comprehensive framework to protect the government’s 
information, operations and assets.  FISMA requires that all federal departments conduct 
annual reviews of the agency’s information security program and report the results of 
those reviews to OMB.  OMB then prepares an annual report to Congress.  In FY 2005, 
Federal agencies spent $5.0 billion securing the government’s information technology.  
OMB’s 2005 report graded a number of Federal departments with a rating of “poor.”  The 
Department of Defense was among agencies with the “poor” rating.   
5. Congressman Neil Abercrombie Press Release 
On May 25, 2006, Congressman Neil Abercrombie issued a press release 
concerning a bill he cosponsored:  The “Veterans’ Identity Protection Act of 2006” (H.R. 
5455).  The legislation aimed at helping veterans whose personal data was stolen from 
the home of a Veterans Affairs (VA) employee.  Representative Abercrombie stated that 
the “legislation will protect veterans from identity theft by calling the VA to (1) provide 
veterans with one year of free credit monitoring—to alert them of changes in their credit 
in order to stop the theft before it gets out of control, and (2) provide veterans with one 
free credit report each year for two years after the end of credit monitoring, in addition to 
the free credit report available under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.”  Additionally, the 
Bill called for $1.25 billion in emergency funds for the first year of implementation to 
protect the approximately 26.5 million veterans. 
6.  H.R. 5835: Veterans Identity and Credit Security Act of 2006 
As ordered by the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs H.R. 5835 would 
require the VA to notify affected individuals when sensitive, personal information is lost, 
stolen, or otherwise compromised.  Additionally, if the Secretary of the VA determines 
there is a risk that the compromised information could be used in a criminal manner, the 
VA would be required to provide services to alleviate any loss those individuals might 
suffer. 
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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that implementing H.R. 5835 
will cost $5 million in 2007 and about $50 million over the 2007-2011 period.  However, 
if the VA were to experience another data breach similar to the recent incident involving 
17 million individuals, the cost could be as much as $1 billion.  The estimates were based 
on projected spending for credit-protection services for affected veterans.  All of these 
services would be provided at no cost to those individuals.  The VA would be required to: 
• Inform individuals of the steps being taken to remedy the problem, 
• Explain to each individual the advantages and disadvantages of requesting 
a fraud alert and a credit security freeze from the major credit-reporting 
agencies, and 
• Contract with the credit-reporting agencies to implement a security freeze 
of the file of each affected individual who requests it - to include credit 
reports every three months, rehabilitation services, and identity theft 
insurance up to $30,000.   
CBO estimates that the VA could be expected to experience an average of three 
incidents a year in which sensitive, personal information is compromised in some 
manner.  Excluding the recent incident, the average number of people affected by a data 
breach has been about 50,000.  The expected cost of notification for a group this size 
would be approximately $500,000 a year.  CBO estimates that 10-15% of those whose 
information is compromised will experience a loss on the order of about $450.  Thus, 
CBO estimates that the cost to the VA would be, on average, about $10 million a year. 
7. Identity Theft and Social Security Numbers Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Committee 
on Energy and Commerce Washington, D.C., September 28, 2004 
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioned a survey to gain a 
better picture of the incidents of identity theft and the impact of the crime on its victims.  
The data showed that within the preceding 12 months, 3.23 million persons discovered 
that an identity thief opened new accounts in the victims’ names.  An additional 6.6 
million consumers learned of misuse of an existing account.  Overall, nearly 10 million 
people (4.6 percent of the adult population) discovered that they were victims of some 
form of identity theft.  These numbers translate into nearly $48 billion in losses to 




by victims trying to resolve their problems.  Social Security Numbers (SSNs) play a 
pivotal role in identity theft since they are used to match consumers to their credit and 
other financial information. 
B. PRIVATE SECTOR AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATION SPONSORED 
STUDIES ON IDENTITY THEFT 
1. Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
EPIC, a public interest research center established in 1994 to focus public 
attention on emerging civil liberties issues, has been involved in congressional testimony 
and various legal cases related to privacy issues.  A summary of the history of the SSN 
and current SSN issues can be found on EPIC’s web site.  EPIC shows the “functionality 
creeps” that has occurred regarding usage of the SSN.  Created in 1936 for the express 
purpose of administering the Social Security Laws, the use of the SSN has steadily 
expanded, despite privacy concerns of citizens and legislators.  In 1961, a significant step 
was made in the “functionality creep” of the SSN when Congress authorized the Internal 
Revenue Service to use SSNs as taxpayer identification numbers.  (EPIC) 
As the “functionality creep” continued, the risk grew that the SSN would become 
a “de facto” national identifier.  The government’s concern for citizens’ privacy resulted 
in the Privacy Act of 1974.  By enacting this act, Congress recognized the dangers of 
widely using the SSN as a personal identifier, and was, in fact, rejecting calls by some for 
creating a national identification number and identification system. The Privacy Act of 
1974 attempted to limit the use of the SSN to only those instances where there was clear 
legal authority to use it. (EPIC) 
With the rise of identity theft resulting from widespread use of the SSN, several 
states have taken steps to limit or eliminate the use of the SSN.  Arizona universities are 
no longer allowed to use the SSN as a student identifier.  Similarly, public and private 
post secondary institutions in Colorado had to discontinue using the SSN as primary 
student identifier. (EPIC)  All public and private schools in New York and West Virginia 
are restricted from using the SSN.  In Kentucky, students have the ability to opt-out of 
using the SSN. 
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Additionally, laws have been passed by several states in response to the identity 
theft epidemic.  Arizona now prohibits the disclosure of the SSN to the general public, 
nor can it be printed on government or private sector identification cards.  Arizona also 
requires a minimum level of protection for online use and transmission of the SSN. 
(EPIC) 
California passed a law that gives individuals the ability to request that a “security 
alert” be placed on their credit record as well as to request a “security freeze” which 
prevents credit agencies from releasing personal information from an individual’s credit 
report. (EPIC)  California also prohibits posting the SSN in a public domain or printing 
the SSN on an identification card.  Additionally, businesses that use the SSN to identify 
customers are not allowed to print the SSN on invoices or bills that are sent through the 
mail. California also requires companies to notify individuals when a security breach is 
experienced. (EPIC) 
Colorado has laws that limit collecting and using the SSN as well as regulations 
that govern the proper destruction of documents containing the SSN.  Insurance 
companies are required to remove the SSN from their customers’ identification cards. 
Georgia also requires businesses to safely dispose of records that contain any personal 
identifiers.  (EPIC) 
Case Law:   
Greidinger v. Davis - When the state of VA passed a statute to compel voters to 
disclose their SSN, which would then be subsequently published in the public voting 
record, a Federal Appeals Court declared that the law was unconstitutional.  The court 
declared that to the extent the Virginia voting laws “permit the public disclosure of 
Greidinger’s SSN as a condition of his right to vote, it creates an intolerable burden on 
that right as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”  (EPIC) 
Beacon Journal v. City of Akron - The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the state 
could not disclose the SSNs of state employees under a state open record law.   The 




their ruling was “…intended to preserve one of the fundamental principles of 
American constitutional law – ours is a government of limited power.  We conclude that 
the United States Constitution forbids disclosure under the circumstances of this case.” 
2. Discussion Paper by Julia S. Cheney for the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia 
This paper is the follow on to a workshop that was conducted on October 3, 2003 
by the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  The paper 
defines identity theft and the need to narrow the definitions to better understand the 
associated crimes and, subsequently, take corrective actions.  The more prevalent crime 
often characterized as “identity theft” can better be defined as payment fraud.  This crime 
typically involves stolen credit cards or credit card numbers and fraudulent charges to 
those credit accounts.  This crime, while more prevalent, is easily detected, stopped and 
corrected.  (Cheney 2003) 
True “identity theft,” however, is much more complicated.  “Fraud losses 
associated with identity theft can be significant, involve multiple accounts, remain 
undetected for much longer period, and ultimately result in costly and time-consuming 
efforts to re-establish the victim’s credit standing.” (Cheney 2003)  True “identity theft” 
involves the thief using personal information of the victim to establish new accounts 
under the victim’s name, but with different contact information (address and phone 
number) to hide the criminal activity from the victim.   
To perpetrate this type of crime, the criminal requires detailed personal 
identification information about the victim to establish the new accounts.  The thief 
acquires this personal information through a variety of sources, including low-tech 
methods such as stealing mail, raiding garbage cans, stealing wallets, etc.  However, there 
is a growing component of technologically advanced criminals who are stealing personal 
identification data through the Internet by hacking into information stored on servers.  
(Cheney 2003)   
Once someone’s identity has been stolen and the thief has established credit card 




prevalence of Internet and online sales, identity thieves have an easier route to perpetrate 
the crime.  Internet sales grew 25 percent in 2002 to $43.5 billion and credit card 
payment fraud was estimated at 1.7 percent of those sales.  (Cheney 2003) 
3. Article by Hal Berghel for Communications of the ACM February 
2003/Vol. 43, No. 2 
Mr. Berghel explores the widespread use of the Social Security Number and the 
resulting dangers.  President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9397 and this began the 
“functionality creep” of the SSN.  This Executive Order was signed in 1943 and 
authorized other government databases to use the SSN as the primary personal identifier.  
This and subsequent expansions using the SSN ignited a national privacy debate that 
eventually prompted Congress to pass the Privacy Act of 1974.  However, this act proved 
too little, too late (Berghel 2003) The Privacy Act did require certain disclosures from 
federal agencies that requested SSNs from individuals, but it relaxed disclosure rules for 
state and local governments, and provided no prohibitions or penalties for the use of 
SSNs in business and commerce. (Berghel 2003)  By enacting disclosure requirements, 
the Privacy Act actually legitimized the government’s widespread use of the SSN as a 
primary personal identifier.  Furthermore, in 1976, The Tax Reform Act authorized state 
and local authorities to use the SSN. (Berghel 2003)  While the majority of the 
“functionally creep” of the SSN occurred in the early years, after establishing the Social 
Security Administration and it’s now infamous SSN, the real damage was to come years 
later. 
Berghel calls the SSN the “holy grail” of all the pieces of identity that an identity 
thief needs to obtain to perpetrate a crime.  With the advent of the internet, coupled with 
the widespread, almost unchecked use of the SSN as a personal identifier, a new form of 
crime has sprouted up which has become the fastest growing crime in the U.S. (Berghel 
2003) 
4. Research Report by Neal Walters of the AARP Public Policy Institute, 
Protecting Social Security Numbers from Identity Theft 
In her testimony before the U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways 
and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security on June 15, 2004, the director of 
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues for the Government Accountability 
Office, Barbara D. Bovbjerg, pointed out that approximately 227 million individuals 
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currently have Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and that, due to the SSN’s uniqueness, it 
has become the “de facto” national identifier.  This status of “de facto” national identifier 
makes SSNs sought after by those who wish to perpetrate fraud.  The director of the 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, J. Howard Beales III, said in 
his testimony that an estimated 10 million individuals were victimized by identity theft 
every year.   
A number of policy options have been proposed at both the state and federal 
levels to strengthen SSN protections. 
• Limiting Display: S. 1332 and S. 29 by the 109th Congress propose 
prohibiting SSN use on identification or eligibility cards provided by 
employers, educational institutions or on state driver’s licenses.  
• Limiting Sale and Purchase of SSNs: Laws and regulations are being 
passed to limit the sale and purchase of SSNs so there must be a 
permissible purpose without affirmative consent.  Such permissible 
purposes, as defined under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), include 
establishing a consumer’s eligibility for credit, insurance, rental housing, 
and employment through background checks in certain circumstances. 
• Increasing Security: Other laws seek to Increase Security for legally 
collected SSNs and enhance penalties for illegal disclosure.  They also 
require enhanced encryption, limited access, and adequate internal 
policies.  To deter violations, increased penalties for misuse are being 
implemented, reflecting the seriousness of such crimes. 
• Increasing Awareness: While increasing awareness of identity theft has 
positively reduced the occurrences of the crime, it has also had some 
undesirable secondary effects.  Increased public concern for security of 
individual identity has negatively affected purchasing decisions, especially 
when it comes to online transactions. 
5. Statement of the Military Officers Association of America (MMOA) 
on “The Veterans’ Identity an Credit Protection Act of 2006” before 
the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee, July 18, 2006 Presented by 
Col. Robert F. Norton, USA (Ret.) 
In response to the recent theft of a VA laptop, Col. Norton reported that the 
MMOA’s position concerning Social Security Account Number access was that they 
“support the objective to curtail routine use of and access to veterans’ SSNs.  The 
MMOA believes all government agencies that use the SSAN as a record identifier should, 
like the state of Virginia, begin now to develop alternative identifiers that pose less risk 
of identity theft.” (Norton 2006) 
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6. CRS Report for Congress:  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards for Drivers’ Licenses, 
Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates by Todd B. Tatelman, 
January 6, 2005 
Today SSNs are used as representations of individual identity, as secure 
passwords, and as keys for linking multiple records.  The problem is that these uses are 
incompatible.  The widespread use of the SSN as an identifier, resulting in its appearance 
on mailing labels, ID cards and badges, and various publicly displayed documents, makes 
it unfit to be a secure password providing access to financial and other personal 
information.  The broad use and public exposure of SSNs has been a major contributor to 
the tremendous growth in identity theft and other forms of credit fraud.     
These issues, as well as threats to national security, were briefly addressed in the 
comprehensive report to the nation, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (9/11 Commission).  The report recommended that the federal 
government set national standards for issuing identification documents, including drivers’ 
licenses, social security cards and birth certificates.  Final legislation, that was signed by 
President Bush on December 17, 2004, contained many of the provisions set forth by the 
report.  Of particular interest to this study was language and provisions concerning the 
display and use of SSNs as identifiers.  “The law amends the Social Security Act to 
expressly prohibit the states or their political subdivisions from displaying, electronically 
or otherwise, a social security number, (or any derivative of such number) on any driver’s 
license or motor vehicle registration, or on any other document issued by states to an 
individual for identification.”  (CRS 2005) 
7.   Quantifying the Financial Impact of IT Security Breaches, Ash Garg, 
Jeffrey Curtis, Hilary Halper, 2003 
This study, due to the conflicting incentives inherent in self-reported data, uses an 
event study methodology to measure the losses to publicly owned companies resulting 
from breaches in IT security.  In doing so it “offers an alternative approach and more 
rigorous evaluation of breaches in IT security.”  (Garg 2003)  The authors focus on the 
impact of breaches on the stock price of the affected companies.  Given the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH), “if the markets are efficient (i.e., they react to all publicly 
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available information) then all present and future effects of a publicly reported security 
breach are captured in the stock price.” (Garg 2003) This study illustrates, from a 
different perspective, the excessive costs associated with incidents of this kind. 
The growing regularity of security incidents is spurring increases in corporate 
investment in IT security spending.  Information security continues to be a large and 
increasing concern for companies, organizations, and government agencies, with no end 
in sight.  Driven by the expanding use of databases, electronic storage of records, and 
globalization, the need for Internet enabled file sharing is accelerating rapidly.  A major 
concern, as illustrated by the authors’ statement, is “the growing use of on-line 
technology and the spread of Internet connectivity around the world, driven by 
globalization, has made cyber attacks much easier today.  Particularly concerning is the 
growing level of terrorist and criminal activity directed at communications networks and 
computer systems.” (Garg 2003) 
The event-study methodology used in this study is based on the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (Fama et al., 1969). The EMH maintains that as soon as new information is 
available it is analyzed by investors and incorporated into share prices.  So, theoretically, 
the change in a stock’s price reflects the impact of events and information on both short 
and long-term company performance (See Figure 3). 
The study focused on twenty-two events that occurred between 1996 and 2002 
that met their criteria.  The authors separate the types of security incidents to estimate the 
economic impact reflected in the share price (market capitalization) over the three-day 
period following the news of the event.  The authors classified security incidents into four 
major types.  Of interest to this thesis are thefts of customer information and credit card 
information.  This category is most similar to the type of breach applicable to this study 
and is distinct due to the fact that the loss of personal information has great potential to 
trigger legal liability to the organization.   
The study found that in the event of the loss of credit card information (personal 
information) the one day drop in market value was 9.3% and it increased to a 14.9% three 
day negative reaction in stock price.  The authors also point out that, “the market  
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perceives a direct correlation between the number of credit card numbers pilfered from a 
company and the appropriate marketplace punishment to the share price as larger thefts 
were penalized more.”  (Garg 2003) 
Of the four categories delineated in the study, all realized a negative abnormal 
return.  Of the most interest to our research, the market reacted most severely to personal 
information theft (between 9 and 15%) likely indicating third party liability (See Figure 
4).  (Garg 2003)  
 
Figure 3.   Raw Return Comparison (From Garg, Curtis and Harper, 2003) 
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III. OVERVIEW OF PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION AND THE 
NATURE OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM 
To better understand the current use of the SSN as well as proposed alternatives 
and their associated costs, an understanding of the original use of the Military Serial 
Number must be addressed. 
A. ORIGINAL USE OF MILITARY SERIAL NUMBERS 
1.  Background 
Originally, the Armed Forces issued service numbers as a method of identifying 
individual members.  These were referred to as Signal Numbers (SN) by the Coast Guard 
and as Military Service Numbers (MSN) by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine 
Corps.  (National Archives 2007) 
Military Service Numbers were unique identifiers, which differed by area and 
mode of entry into the Armed Forces.  These numbers represented the region from which 
the person entered and whether they were drafted or volunteered for service (See Table 
1).  It was not possible to derive a Social Security Number from a Military Serial Number 
or visa versa because they were entirely unrelated numbers assigned by different 
government agencies.  (Vietnam Research by Veterans 2007) 
The first two numbers, as shown in the table below, correspond to the first two 
digits of serial numbers issued between the years 1940-1969.  
(1) Regular and Reserve Air Force and Army 
(2) Draftees between 1940-1946 (30-39 million) 












STATE (1) (2) (3) 
Alabama 18 38 54 
Alaska 18 38 54 
Arizona 18 38 54 
Arkansas 18 38 54 
California 19 39 56 
Colorado 17 37 55 
Connecticut 11 31 51 
Delaware 12 32 51 
Florida 14 34 53 
Georgia 14 34 56 
Hawaii 10 30 50 
Idaho 19 39 56 
Illinois 16 36 55 
Indiana 15 35 52 
Iowa 17 37 55 
Kansas 17 37 55 
Kentucky 15 35 52 
Louisiana 18 38 54 
Maine 11 31 51 
Maryland 13 33 52 
Massachusetts 11 31 51 
Michigan 16 36 55 
Minnesota 17 37 55 
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STATE (1) (2) (3) 
Mississippi 14 34 53 
Missouri 17 37 55 
Montana 19 39 56 
Nebraska 17 37 55 
Nevada 19 39 56 
New Hampshire 11 31 51 
New Jersey 12 32 51 
New Mexico 18 38 54 
New York 12 32 51 
North Carolina 14 34 53  
North Dakota 17 37 55 
Ohio 15 35 52 
Oklahoma 18 38 54 
Oregon 19 39 56 
Pennsylvania 13 33 52 
Rhode Island 11 31 51 
South Carolina 14 34 53 
South Dakota 17 37 55 
Tennessee 14 34 53 
Texas 18 38 54 
Utah 19 39 56 
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STATE (1) (2) (3) 
Vermont 11 31 51 
Virginia 13 33 52 
West Virginia 15 35 52 
Washington 19 39 56 
Wisconsin 16 36 55 
Wyoming 17 37 55 
Panama 10 30 50 
Puerto Rico 10 30 50 
Table 1.   Military Serial Number Mode and Location Code (From: Vietnam Research 
by Veterans 2007) 
 
The Air Force and Army ended the use of service numbers on July 1, 1969, the Navy and 
Marine Corps on January 1, 1972, and the Coast Guard followed suit on October 1, 1974, 
in favor of using the Social Security Number (SSN).  (The National Archives 2007) 
B. ADVENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS 
1. Use by Civilians 
The Social Security Act of 1935 created Social Security Numbers (SSN).  They 
were intended for the social security program to guarantee American workers received 
the proper proceeds for income rerouted into the new program.  The first SSNs were 
issued the following year.  “The new pension system marked the first time in the United 
States that a government agency would be required to collect and use personal 
information from most of the population.” (Smith 2002)  
25 
 
Figure 5.   Picture of the Social Security Card (From: www.ssa.gov, Retrieved March 
2007) 
 
The SSN consists of nine digits, commonly written as three fields separated by 
hyphens: AAA-GG-SSSS.  The first three-digit field is called the “area number.”  The 
central, two-digit field is called the “group number.”  The final, four-digit field is called 
the “serial number.”   (Social Security Online 2007)  
a. Area Numbers 
Area numbers are assigned to geographical locations, increasing from east 
to west across the continental United States (See Table 2).  Where appropriate, they were 
assigned according to state (or territorial) boundaries.  Since 1972 this number has related 
to the home address provided by the applicant at the time of application for the SSN. 
If the initial series of area numbers were exhausted, the assignments were 
expanded as required.  The following table illustrates the initial method of assignment.  
Currently the Social Security Administration acknowledges area numbers as high as 768. 
 
SSN BY STATE 
001-003 NH 400-407 KY 530 NV 
004-007 ME 408-415 TN 531-539 WA 
008-009 VT 416-424 AL 540-544 OR 
010-034 MA 425-428 MS 545-573 CA 
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SSN BY STATE 
035-039 RI 429-432 AR 574 AK 
040-049 CT 433-439 LA 575-576 HI 
050-134 NY 440-448 OK 577-579 DC 
135-158 NJ 449-467 TX 580 VI Virgin Islands 
159-211 PA 468-477 MN 581-584 PR Puerto Rico 
212-220 MD 478-485 IA 585 NM 
221-222 DE 486-500 MO 586 PI Pacific Islands* 
223-231 VA 501-502 ND 587-588 MS 
232-236 WV 503-504 SD 589-595 FL 
237-246 NC 505-508 NE 596-599 PR Puerto Rico 
247-251 SC 509-515 KS 600-601 AZ 
252-260 GA 516-517 MT 602-626 CA 
261-267 FL 518-519 ID 627-645 TX 
268-302 OH 520 WY 646-647 UT 
303-317 IN 521-524 CO 648-649 NM 
318-361 IL 525 NM 650-699 unassigned, for 
future use 
362-386 MI 526-527 AZ 700-728 Railroad workers 
through 1963, then 
discontinued 
387-399 WI 528-529 UT 769-799 unassigned, for 
future use. 




b. Group Numbers 
The group number is associated with the order SSNs are issued for a 
specific region.  Prior to 1965 only half the group numbers were used.  For an 
unidentified reason, the SSA used odd numbers below 10 and even numbers above 9. The 
system was later modified to allow assignment of low even numbers and high odd 
numbers.  The current process assigns group numbers for each area number in the 
following order: 
• Odd numbers, 01 to 09 
• Even numbers, 10 to 98 
• Even numbers, 02 to 08 
• Odd numbers, 11 to 99  
• Group codes of “00” aren't assigned  
All possible area numbers are assigned with each group number before 
using the next group number to maintain a chronological ordering of SSNs within the 
region.   
c. Serial Numbers 
Serial numbers are allocated in sequential order within each area and 
group number as the applications are processed.  Serial number “0000” is never used.  
(CPSR 2001)   
Initially the Social Security card had “NOT FOR IDENTIFICATION” 
printed on its face, giving the sense of confidentiality.  However, as time passed, because 
of its characteristics, both the federal government and civilian institutions began using it 
for numerous purposes not related to its original intent.   
In 1943, Roosevelt signed Executive Order (EO) 9397 requiring federal 
agencies to use the SSN when creating new record-keeping systems.  The order directed 
the Social Society Board to designate this number to all individuals required by a federal 
agency to have one.  (Roosevelt 1943) 
In 1962, the Internal Revenue Service began using the SSN as the 
taxpayer identification number.  (Social Security Online, History 2007)  This appeared to 
be the first time the number was recognized for its ease at linking records.  In 1964, SSNs 
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were issued to high school students.  The 1960’s Social Security Administration manual 
stated that one of its reasons for such action was “to use the SSN for both automated data 
processing and control purposes, so the progress of students could be traced throughout 
their school lives across district, county and state lines.” (Social Security Online, 
Administration Claims Manual 2007)   
Many more organizations recognized the benefit of using this unique 
identifier to link, track and recall information.  In a short period of time colleges, 
Medicare, state Medicaid, elderly programs, and Indian health programs followed suit, 
just to name a few.   
Of particular interest is the 1966 decision by the Veterans’ Administration 
(VA) to adopt the number for its use.  The VA began using the SSN for hospital 
admissions and other accounting purposes.  Given this the Pentagon began to switch from 
the MSN to the SSN as the service number for all military personnel.  (Social Security 
Online, History 2007)   
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970, 31 U.S. Code 1051, required banks 
and other financial institutions to record SSNs for all their customers.  (Bank Secrecy Act 
1970)  Many institutions, for ease of operations, required the individual’s SSN be 
displayed on the face of their checks.  What would eventually become know as “identity 
theft” dramatically increased.   
This single, convenient, and widely used number made the merging of 
records, especially large data systems, easy and manageable.  In 1972, the United States 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) produced a report: Records, 
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens. This report recommended that the SSN not be 
used as an identifier.  According to the HEW committee “the federal government itself 
has been in the forefront of expanding the use of the SSN.” (HEW 1973, p. 121) 
This report became the foundation for the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 
which attempted to limit the abuse of the SSN.  The Privacy Act of 1974 required 




disclosures when government agenciess requested the number.  Agencies which were 
already using the SSN as an identifier before January 1, 1975 were allowed to continue 
using it.   
The Act requires that any federal agency that requests an individual’s 
Social Security Number has to disclose the following: 
• The authority (whether granted by statute, or by executive order of the 
President) which authorizes the solicitation of the information and whether 
disclosure of such information is mandatory or voluntary;  
• The principal purposes for which the information is intended to be used;  
• The routine uses which may be made of the information, as published 
annually in the Federal Register, and  
• The effects on a person for not providing all or any part of the requested 
information.  
The Act requires state and local agencies which request the SSN to inform 
the individual of only three things: 
• Whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary 
• By what statutory or other authority the SSN is solicited 
• What uses will be made of the number ((PRIVACY ACT OF 1974) 
A weakness of the Privacy Act is that it does not carry any penalties. 
The SSNs usage again expanded with The Tax Reform Act of 1976. This 
Act granted authority to state or local tax, welfare, driver's license, or motor vehicle 
registration authorities to use the number in order to establish identities.  Meanwhile, the 
use of the number continued to expand in the private sector.  SSNs were being asked for 
to rent an apartment, get a fishing license, begin telephone service, donate blood and get 
medical treatment.  The SSN became essential in the establishment of credit.  (Social 
Security Online Tax Reform Act of 1976) 
2. Use by Military 
The military’s use of the SSN actually began as a result of actions of the VA.  
Beginning in 1966, the VA started using it as their hospital admissions number and 
designed their entire patient records’ system around it.  Shortly thereafter, in 1969 the 
DoD adopted the SSN and did away with the military service number that had previously 
been used.  (The National Archives 2007) 
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Identity theft and the financial implications that accompany it were not even 
fathomable at the time that this transition took place.  Computers and data base systems, 
of course, did not exist, so the transition was a fairly straightforward one.  Forms were 
simply re-printed to reflect a block for the SSN instead of a service number. 
In 1981, use of the SSN as the primary identifier was strengthened even further 
with the passage of the Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 97-86), which 
required the use of SSNs, by the Selective Service System. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL/LEGAL ISSUES 
1. Constitutional Review 
While the U.S. Constitution does not directly address privacy, The Supreme Court 
has held that a right to privacy does, in fact, exist in the Constitution.  It has been the 
basis behind Roe v Wade and host of other Court decisions and has been considered a 
“core value” behind the entire Bill of Rights.  In Griswold v. Connecticut the Supreme 
Court found that there was an independent right of privacy.  This right of privacy was not 
found in any one provision of the Constitution, but rather from the intent of the entire Bill 
of Rights, with particular attention given to the 4th Amendment.  
The 4th Amendment states: “'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”  While this amendment does not directly address privacy, it has been 
used as the basis for many Court decisions regarding privacy rights. 
2. Legal Review 
Amicus Curiae is a Latin phrase for “friend of the court.” The American legal 
system allows a person, or organization, who is not a party to litigation to provide 





This legal review follows and includes excerpts, as they apply to this thesis, from 
an “Interests of AMICUS” brief written by Marc Rotenberg and David L. Sobel from the 
organization Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR).  The brief 
advises the court on issues related to the case of Greidinger v. Davis.  (CPSR 1993) 
The Privacy Act of 1974 clearly acknowledged the threat to privacy that 
disclosure of the SSN presents.  Once acquired, it links an individual to databases holding 
financial, medical, educational, and credit information, all of which are unrelated to the 
number’s original use.   
Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Elliot Richardson acknowledged in his 
1971 testimony before Congress that “there would certainly be an enormous convenience 
in having a single identifier for each individual ... [making] more efficient the acquisition, 
storage, and use of data .... It is the very ease of assembling complete records, of course, 
which raises the specter of invasion of privacy.”  (HEW 1971) 
The HEW report that followed recommended wide-ranging legal safeguards for 
federal record systems.  The committee highlighted the hazards inherent in using the SSN 
as a personal identifier when they stated that “(it) would enhance the likelihood of 
arbitrary or uncontrolled linkage of records about people, particularly between 
government or government-supported automated personal data systems ...” (HEW 1971, 
p. 122)  
The committee recommended enacting the following restrictions on the disclosure 
and dissemination of the SSN:   
• Uses of the SSN should be limited to only those purposes required by the 
federal government. 
• Federal agencies should not require the use of the SSN absent statutory 
authority. 
• Congress should evaluate any proposed use of the SSN. 
• Individuals have the right to refuse to provide their SSNs and should 
suffer no harm for exercising this right. 
Organizations required by Federal law to obtain the SSN use the number solely 
for the purpose for which it was obtained and not make any secondary use of, or disclose 
the SSN without the informed consent of the individual.  (HEW 1971, pp. 124-25)  
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Congress agreed the following year when these recommendations became the 
basis of the Privacy Act. 
The growing number of computerized public and private sector databases has 
increased the frequency of abuse of the SSN.  In 1991, the Subcommittee on Social 
Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means noted, “[t]he extensive use of 
computers has resulted in the wide-spread private sector use of the social security number 
as an identifier…  The ability of the private sector to gather information, such as credit 
history, grocery store purchases, medical records (including pre-natal information), 
family medical histories and genetic makeup has raised fears that in the near future 
unregulated companies will serve as national identity bureaus collecting and dispersing 
an individual's most private information.”  (Subcommittee on Social Security of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means 1991) 
Gwendolyn S. King, Commissioner of Social Security, testifying before the 
subcommittee stated that, “concerns in this country that [SSN might become a universal 
identifier], center on questions of individual privacy and the increased possibility of the 
invasion of privacy if all records pertaining to an individual could be accessed under one 
number...The need for a unique number for individual records in computer systems 
means that use of the SSN is likely to continue to expand in the years ahead…  we (SSA) 
have a deep concern that individuals not be harmed through carelessness in the use of the 
SSN.”  (Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means 
1991, p. 25) 
It is clear that possession of such a powerful number would afford all in its 
possession easy access to a large amount of sensitive information about an individual.  
Forty years ago, Congressman Frank Horton pointed out that “one of the most practical 
of our present safeguards of privacy is the fragmented nature of personal information.  It 
is scattered in little bits across the geography and years of our life.  Retrieval is 
impractical and often impossible.  A central data bank removes completely this 
safeguard.”  (Special Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy of the House Committee on 
Government Operations 1966).   
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Use of the SSN, for reasons unrelated to the Social Security Administration 
significantly decrease the “fragmented nature of personal information,” as Congressman 
Horton highlighted and Congress addressed in the Privacy Act of 1974.  (Special 
Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy of the House Committee on Government 
Operations 1966).      
This concern is not exclusive to the United States.  In Canada, “the abuse of the 
Social Insurance Number is the only privacy issue that has regularly commanded the 
attention of members of the House of Commons in the last twenty years.”  (Flaherty 
1989, p. 281)  
Indeed, Canadian lawmakers have taken action to check the movement of the 
Social Insurance Number (SIN) toward becoming a universal personal identifier.  
Canadian Forces have instituted a Canadian Forces military service number (CF) to 
replace the SIN as the identifier and a separate employee identifier is being introduced for 
federal employees.   
In addition, France has made efforts to restrict the use of similar national 
numbers.  In 1980, France's National Commission on Informatics and Freedom denied 
the establishment of international identity cards and personal identification numbers.  The 
French chose to assign the identification number to the card instead of the individual.  By 
taking this approach, any card loss or breach in personal data would result in a new card 
and number being assigned to the individual.  (Flaherty 1989, p. 227)  
Still other countries have taken measure to protect citizens’ privacy.  Portugal’s 
constitution, Article 35 (1-6), prohibits the routine interconnection of files and has made 
it clear that “citizens shall not be given all purpose national identification numbers.”  
Greece uses a system containing national identity numbers for specified public sector 
data files, but has legislated that their linkage is forbidden.  The Australian Privacy Act of 
1988 addresses the use of their tax file number.  The Act bars its use as a national 
identification system by “whatever means.”   (Spencer 1990, p. 60)  
U.S. Federal Courts have acknowledged the gravity of the disclosure of SSNs.  
The courts, by looking toward Congressional intent embodied in the Federal Privacy Act 
of 1974, recognize that employees have a strong privacy interest in their SSNs.  
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Congress, in passage of the Privacy Act, acknowledged this interest by making unlawful 
any denial of a right, benefit, or privilege by a government agency because of an 
individual's refusal to disclose his SSN.  In the Congressional Report, which followed 
passage of the Privacy Act, the Committee stated that the extensive use of Social Security 
Numbers as universal identifiers in both the public and private sectors is “one of the most 
serious manifestations of privacy concerns in the Nation.”   (House Committee on 
Government Operations 1974)  
This admitted recognition provides persuasive policy arguments against the 
practice this thesis addresses.  The potential for injury, whether financial, private, or from 
a national security standpoint, is not hypothetical.  Occurrences of identity theft, fraud, 
and invasion of privacy, have increased as nonessential uses of the SSN have 
mushroomed.   
D. STAKE HOLDERS 
Use of the SSN a personal identifier has become so pervasive, that almost every 
organization within the DoD can be considered a “stake holder” or interested party 
should the DoD decide to transition to a MIN.   
1.   Unit Level 
Every unit, down to the company or even platoon level uses the SSN to track and 
identify personnel.  Unit rosters are produced daily, sometimes hourly as a unit prepares 
for a deployment or exercise and personnel are changed, moved around, added or deleted.  
When you consider the simple case that there might be 4 John Smiths in a 160-man 
company, the SSN quickly and easily makes a positive identification.  Until very 
recently, the SSN was even required to be written on the outside of mail envelopes to 
ensure the letter was delivered to the correct individual. 
2.   Headquarters Level 
As you go up in an organization, the number of persons and administrative 
functions increase dramatically.  Service headquarters (HQs) are responsible for pay, 
orders, promotions, awards, etc.  The SSN is currently used to identify individuals in each 
of these, and many more functions.  The SSN truly has become the “de-facto” universal 
identifier, particularly within the DoD where the SSN is used for everything from 
membership in the club systems to your ID card. 
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3.   Data Warehouses 
Each Service, the VA, and DoD have their respective database systems and data 
warehousing capabilities.  The Marine Corps’ data warehousing system is the Total Force 
Data Warehouse (TFDW).  This system “extracts” or receives data from over 30 different 
sources and holds over 13 years worth of personnel data.  This data is combined and 
compiled based on the SSN.   
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) is a comprehensive repository of 
personnel, manpower, training and financial data.  The DMDC data and programs 
encompass the military personnel life cycle from accession to retirement, reserve 
components, families and dependents of Service Members, and civilian employees of the 
DoD. The DMDC data is combined and cross-referenced by SSN and as such, would 
certainly be considered one of the main “stake holders” for any transition to a MIN as the 
primary DoD personal identifier.    
E. RECENT IDENTITY THEFT AND LOST DATA EVENTS 
1.   Data Purposefully Stolen or Hacked 
In 1997, a major breach of high ranking military officers occurred when identity 
thieves obtained the SSN’s of over 40 officers in the U.S. Marine Corps and Navy.  The 
thieves used the SSN’s to create fraudulent credit card accounts.  This case brought a lot 
of attention to the military regarding identity theft, because a privacy advocate, Glen L 
Roberts had obtained the names and SSN’s of over 4500 military officers from the 
publicly available congressional record and posted them on the internet.  Of course, it 
was never clear if the thieves obtained the numbers from Roberts’ posting or from the 
congressional record. (WebTV Addict 1999)  
In 2003, the State of California experienced a loss of the personal data of 265,000 
employees (including the Governor) when a hacker breached a secure database. The 
database was run by an outside storage company that failed to report the breach for 3 
weeks.  Consequently, the California Legislature hastily passed legislation that requires 
companies to inform customers of a breach involving personal data.  However, 
throughout the nation, most companies remain quiet regarding lost or stolen data.  The 
FBI and Computer Security Institute found 60% of companies studied had a computer 
security breach in the year studied and yet only 33% reported it. (Pelgrin 2003) 
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In August 2003, the Navy experienced a breach when a hacker broke into the 
Navy’s purchase card program issued by Citibank.  Citibank and the Navy were forced to 
cancel all of the cards to ensure the accounts were not used fraudulently.  The breach 
affected approximately 22,000 card holders. (Pelgrin 2003) 
2.  Data Lost or Misplaced 
Laptop computers and flash memory thumb drives have ushered in a new age of 
computer portability and worker productivity, but their small size has increased the 
likelihood of lost or misplaced storage devices.  Considering laptops alone, there were 
129 reported instances of lost laptops that contained personnel data.  One of the largest 
losses of data involved a laptop lost by a Boeing employee on December 13, 2006, which 
included the names and SSNs of 382,000 employees.  Ernst and Young lost a laptop on 
June 1, 2006, which included the credit information of 243,000 Hotels.com employees.  
Fidelity lost a laptop on April 4th of the same year, which included the retirement account 
information of 196,000 individuals.  (Fortune January 22, 2007, Vol. 155 No. 1, publisher 
Time Inc., Telis Demos)  So far, there have been no crimes resulting from any of these 
losses, but given the process that an identity thief has to go through before he can 
capitalize on the crime; it may be years before the 2006 losses result in crimes.    
In 2006, a graduate student lost a thumb drive containing the SSNs of over 
200,000 current and former Marines.  In the same year the personal information of over 
100,000 sailors and Marines was erroneously made available on the Naval Safety 
Center’s Web site. (Hoellwarth 2006) 
F. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The entering research assumption is that both the DOD and VA maintain the 
following personnel management system security objectives: 
• Availability:  the purpose of the system can be met, and the system is 
accessible to those who need to use it. 
• Confidentiality:  information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals. 




The use of a MIN as the primary personal identifier in all of these various 
personnel management systems would better meet the above objectives.  The MIN would 
allow more people to have access to the systems because it would not jeopardize 
individual personal financial accounts.  This increases the availability of the information 
and the eases the use of the systems involved.  Since a MIN does not threaten the 
financial status of an individual, it also increases the confidentiality of the management 
systems.  By lessening the impact of a potential loss, a MIN based system allows easier, 
more unrestricted use thereby increasing the Integrity of the system. 
“Every organization has oceans of data and acres of information.  However, only 
those organizations able to transform their disparate data streams into timely, relevant, 
and coherent information will ultimately achieve a real competitive edge.  One of the 
organization’s goals must be to improve the return on data by cascading information 
down through every level of the organization.”  (Read et al., 2003) 
Given the demonstrated risks inherent in using the SSN as a personal identifier, as 
well as the frequency of the inadvertent dissemination of SSNs, continued use by the 
DoD and VA should only be sustained if it is shown to be absolutely necessary and if less 
intrusive alternatives do not exist.  MINs are a viable alternative that would better serve 
DoD and the VA’s interests in administering their systems of military/DOD 
identification.  A single-purpose identifier may actually enhance personal privacy by 
restricting the extent of a person's identity that must be disclosed to interact with a large 
institution.  Library cards and driver's licenses are examples of such limited purpose 
cards. 
Service members and veterans are at an even greater risk than society as a whole 
due to the military’s pervasive use of the SSN.  This pervasive use demonstrates the 
utility of a personal identifier, but it may be that the SSN is the wrong number to use for 
this purpose.  Policy changes that merely restrict usage of the SSN or technological 
measures such as encryption and passwords drastically reduce the utility of the SSN as a 
personal identifier and lower the productivity of those that have used it freely in the past.   
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A viable alternative to the SSN exists.  By replacing the SSN with a MIN within 
DoD and the VA, all potential SSN losses are completely eliminated from all DoD 
sources.  Given the above problem, this thesis will attempt to estimate the monetary costs 
and benefits of switching to using a Military Identification Number as the primary 
personal identifier, as well as conduct a cost benefit analysis of such a wholesale switch.  
The objective of the thesis is to determine if it is cost effective to society to conduct such 
a switch. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
A. MILITARY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
The main idea behind this thesis is the wholesale transition from the Social 
Security Number (SSN) to a Military Identification Number (MIN) as the primary 
identifier throughout the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Veterans’ Administration 
(VA).  By eliminating the SSN at all but one critical location, lost or stolen data becomes 
all but useless to the identity thief.  The SSN would still need to be held at the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) since they are responsible for withholding 
Social Security Tax and making direct deposits of pay and benefits to financial 
institutions.  DFAS would be the sole location/system that held the match up between the 
MIN and the SSN.  By limiting SSN use to one DFAS location, DoD could concentrate 
security measures on one system and location.  All other computer systems and 
databases, even ID cards and paper records would only use the MIN.  This design would 
minimize the data’s worth to an identity thief, while increasing the usefulness of the 
system to its users.  This increase would be dramatic since they will not have to 
implement cumbersome security measures. 
1. Other Organizations that Have Already Made the Switch 
Many public and private organizations are initiating similar transitions to the type 
this thesis is analyzing.  Various states Department of Motor Vehicles are removing the 
SSN from driver’s licenses in favor of unique, single purpose, state identification 
numbers.  The same holds true for Colleges and Universities.  Many have gone through 
the transition and are no longer using the SSN as a personal identifier. 
B. TECHNOLOGY 
Technology plays an ever increasing role in the proliferation of identity theft, but 
is also often viewed as the answer to thwart identity theft.    
1. Proliferation of Identity Theft 
The expansion of the Internet has made it increasingly easy to steal someone’s 
identity and use it to open fraudulent accounts used for financial gain.  This is primarily 
due to the fact that the Internet provides a degree of anonymity that did not exist 40 years 
ago when the “functionality creep” of the SSN began.  (Cheney 2003) 
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Internet sales grow approximately 25 percent per year, and are the preferred 
environment for the identity thief to carry out his crime, the total dollar amount of 
identity theft has continued to increase in recent years, even while the total number of 
identity theft incidents has only declined slightly. 
Increasingly adept identity thieves are using technology to crack databases and 
steal identity information.  This is typically accomplished by hacking a database system 
through an Internet connection or accessing an encrypted database that was obtained by 
stealing a laptop or thumb-drive. 
2.   Tool to Prevent Identity Theft 
Technology is the primary instrument being used to thwart identity theft.  The 
increased incidence of user names and passwords is accompanied by the frustration of 
keeping track of them all.  While this has no doubt reduced the occurrences of identity 
theft, it is far from a perfect solution.  Plus, it continues to reduce the utility and 
productivity of using a universal personal identifier that drove the widespread use of the 
SSN in the first place.  Once encryption or password technology is implemented, it is 
followed by security measures being cracked by identity thieves.  Each cracked measure 
prompts a new counter-measure, which is eventually cracked once again.  It is reasonable 
to assume that this pattern will continue.  In fact, security software companies and virus 
protection companies count on this continued pattern for their very existence. 
C. ACCESS RESTRICTIONS 
Access restrictions and other policy changes are also part of the evolving “status 
quo.”  Such policy changes are driven by increased public identity theft awareness 
resulting from news coverage and even popular television commercials advertising a 
particular credit card’s identity theft measures.  Policy changes sometimes take the form 
of actual law, driven by state or federal statues, or simply procedural changes executed by 





V. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A. REQUIREMENTS AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Requirements 
Since the conversion from using the Social Security Number (SSN) as the primary 
personal identifier to the use of a Military Identification Number (MIN) would be 
implemented primarily through the Information Technology Systems, OMB Circular A-
130 and OMB Circular A-94 are applicable.  OMB Circular A-130 requires a benefit-cost 
analysis for each information system and OMB Circular A-94 provides the necessary 
guidelines and discount rates for the benefit-cost analysis. 
2. Methodology 
The public focus on the efficient use of tax dollars has intensified hand-in-hand 
with increased demand for better accountability.  To make better, more informed 
decisions, policy makers need solid analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the 
available choices.  The variables can be economic or intangible, but must be relevant and 
fit with the organization’s mission and objectives.   
Costs to implement a project include changing computer databases systems, 
training costs, materials (ID cards), administrative costs, and additional labor costs.  
These are fairly straightforward and apparent.  Benefits, however, are not quite as easy to 
quantify. 
Data collection needs to focus on both tangible and intangible benefits (to include 
public trust, morale, etc.). Intangible benefits may be difficult to convert into a monetary 
figure; however, they should not be disregarded when comparing the benefits of a 
project.  Soft data, such as improved communication, increased job satisfaction, enhanced 
moral, policy changes, are a few examples of these intangible benefits.   
The issue is that information security data is difficult to collect.  Security risk is 
difficult to quantify and qualify.  It is impossible to predict the time, methods, or 




must be estimated and carefully checked with stakeholders; however, very few appear 
willing or able to give sound feedback.  Consequently, assumptions must be made and 
existing data relied upon.  
This thesis uses data that classifies misuse cases into categories of threats for 
which nationally surveyed risks and financial data are publicly available.  The cost 
benefit analysis framework derives its figures from research, surveys, and actual misuse 
cases found in our literature review. 
These cost assumptions are reasonable with regard to expected probabilities and 
costs associated with such misuses and breaches.  For example, OMB, through annual 
national surveys shows that over the period of a year there are average probabilities of 
occurrence and ranges of financial impact due to exposure to these breaches.   
Cost avoidance is used as the primary tangible benefit; however, if intangible 
benefits can be monetized, they should be included as well.  If not they should be 
addressed and acknowledged.   
Once reasonable numbers are agreed upon, evaluation techniques will be applied 
to aid in the analysis.  Popular evaluation techniques used in the private sector are: 
• Payback period 
• Discounted payback period 
• Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) 
• Net present value (NPV) 
• Internal rate of return (IRR)  
• Probabilistic Net Present Value (PNPV) 
3. Purpose 
A cost to benefit analysis (CBA) best matches the approach of this research to 
provide the decision maker with an analysis of alternatives.  The scope of this research 
precludes the CBA from analyzing all of the possible alternatives available and therefore, 
compares the following two primary options:   
• The status quo of continued use of the SSN as the primary personal 
identifier, and  
• The proposed alternative of eliminating the SSN and converting to a 
Military Identification Number.   
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While at first glance this may appear as a very limited view of the alternatives, 
closer consideration reveals otherwise.  Other alternatives that come to mind, such as 
encryption technologies, policy changes, legal requirements, or criminal enforcement 
procedures designed to protect identity data and prevent identity theft, are captured 
within the status quo alternative.  These types of options are already being implemented 
and expanded upon.  The proposed alternative of eliminating the SSN and replacing it 
with an MIN is the only real differentiated option resulting in the decreased impact of 
breaches. 
B. COST 
Due to the difficulty in collecting accurate implementation estimates of such a 
conversion, this research requires a multi-directional approach.  The intention is to arrive 
at a realistic and reasonable cost estimate to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.  The first 
method is to use the Y2K event as a proxy.  The second estimation methodology used is 
to apply a factor to existing IT Operation and Maintenance budgets.  The theory of this 
multi-directional approach is to examine different processes that bring to the surface 
more issues and components of the overall expenditures than a single approach would.  
An additional advantage of the multiple approach process is that it compares and 
contrasts the final cost figures involved in such a project.  Glaring differences in final 
figures act to provide a signal for the necessity of further exploration and deeper analysis 
of one or both of the approaches, as well as the inputs used in their computations. 
Y2K is used because of the IT/data base similarities.  The assumption is that the 
conversion from SSNs to a MIN will be most similarly related to such an effort, though 
smaller in magnitude with regard to the number of systems affected and scope of work 
per system.   
The Budget Estimate method justifies costs by breaking out the main sub-
processes required from start to finish, taking care to only count those costs not shared by 
both alternatives.     
1.  Y2K Proxy 
The recent Y2K problem can be considered a proxy for estimating the cost of 
the SSN to MIN conversion.  For the purpose of this thesis, the various aspects of fixing 
the Y2K problem are assumed similar in scope and cost as conversion to a MIN as the 
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primary personal identifier, relative to the total number of data systems.  Y2K was 
undoubtedly more involved than the database conversions necessary for the SSN to MIN 
conversion, since the Y2K fix had to address each and every line of code in every 
software program where a two digit year was used.  Given this, a range of factors from 10 
to 25 percent of the Y2K costs has been assigned to the SSN/MIN conversion.  While this 
assumption may not be wholly accurate, it is reasonable to expect that the cost be within 
this order of magnitude and adequate for this cost benefit analysis.   While the Y2K 
problem affected almost every DoD computer system, including weapon systems, 
communication systems and manpower systems, the MIN conversion would only affect 
manpower systems that currently use the SSN as the primary personal identifier.  It took 
approximately 6 years for the DoD to address the Y2K problem at a cost of $3.596 
billion.   This cost covered approximately 2,101 mission critical systems and 5,488 
mission support systems and covers the entire correction process, including identifying 
the problem, fixing systems and conducting tests.   Using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) inflator, this equates to $4.2 billion in 2007 dollars. The VA’s Y2K costs add an 
additional $231.4 million.  (Informed Budgeteer 2000)  This equates to $310 million in 
2007 dollars using the same CPI inflator. 
No one actually knows the total number of manpower systems being used 
throughout the DoD.  The Department of Defense has approximately 10,000 computer 
systems, of which about 2,500 are designated as mission critical. The estimated 10,000 
systems cover everything from war fighting systems that have nothing to do with SSNs to 
the various manpower and logistics systems.  The DOD requested approximately $19 
billion for fiscal year 2004 to operate, maintain, and modernize its reported 2,274 
business systems. 
This estimate, however, almost certainly under-represents the true number of 
business systems in DoD.  Since DoD does not centrally manage its computer systems, it 
does not have an accurate method of identifying and tracking these systems.  DoD relies 
on what is commonly known as the “data call” to obtain this type of information.  The 
“data call” goes out to each DoD department requesting certain information, in this case, 
the number of business systems in existence.  However, each of the DoD’s departments is 
currently refining their own inventory and, therefore, cannot give a truly accurate answer 
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back to DoD.  For instance, the DoD logistics community currently reports 565 systems, 
which are included in the 2,274 business systems previously reported.  However, the 
logistics community recently identified an additional 3,000 potential systems of which at 
least 1,900 were actual systems.   
Of the 2,274 business systems reported within DoD, 665 are related to Human 
Resource Management.  An additional 10 are under the Installations and Environment 
category, but related to personnel.  Logistics systems account for an additional 565 
systems and some portion of these deal with SSNs and personnel.  Accounting and 
Finance make up 542 systems, of which some portion would undoubtedly pertain to 
personnel that use SSNs. (GAO-04-615 DOD Business Systems) 
Using the previous research and accounting for its under reported number of 
systems, it is estimated that the number of systems that use the SSN and would, therefore, 
need to be converted to a MIN is in the order of 1,000 systems.  This is approximately 10 
percent of the total number of systems involved in the Y2K problem.   
To account for the fewer systems involved, we take 10 percent of DoD’s Y2K 
costs in 2007 dollars which is $420 million.  Reducing this again by factors of 10 and 25 
percent, acknowledges the difference between the scope of the Y2K problem and the 
SSN to MIN conversion and gives an estimated DoD wide conversion cost of between 
$42 million and $105 million. 
Since the VA deals exclusively with personnel (veterans), it is assumed that 100 
percent of the VA’s Y2K costs dealt with manpower systems.  Following the same logic 
applied above, the research concludes that the VA contributes an additional $31 to $69 
million, in 2007 dollars to total costs.   
Taking the low and high estimates for both the DoD and VA and adding them 
together results in a range of $73 to $174 million as the cost estimate for the SSN to MIN 
conversion.  This methodology shows that the VA’s costs are 65.7 percent the size of 
DoD’s. 
2.   Budget Estimate Method 
The second method of estimating the cost of the SSN to MIN Conversion is a 
budgeting method.  This involves using the DoD’s IT budget and applying a factor to 
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account for the additional costs to implement the SSN to MIN conversion.  To get an idea 
of the size of the problem, a review of the sheer magnitude of DoD’s IT budget is 
appropriate.   
DoD’s FY2004 IT budget was $28 billion. which includes $18.8 billion for the 
2,274 business systems previously identified.  Of the $18.8 billion, $4.8 billion was for 
development and modernization while the remaining $14 billion was for operations and 
maintenance.  (2004 GAO Report, Business Systems Modernization)  As previously 
explained in the Y2K cost estimate method, the 2,274 business systems can be further 
reduced to approximately 1000 systems that deal with SSNs, equating to 44 percent of 
the business systems.  44 percent of the $14 billion in operations and maintenance is 
$6.15 billion.  This $6.15 billion, therefore, represents the amount of the IT operations 
and maintenance budget that goes to systems that deal with the SSN. 
A reasonable cost estimate for the SSN to MIN conversion would be 2 to 3 
percent of this $6.15 billion in operations and maintenance costs.  This 2 to 3 percent 
factor was derived from a telephone interview with the Vice President of a major 
consulting firm that provides one of the industry’s most comprehensive set of decision-
support modeling tools to help managers and cost analysts plan and estimate critical 
projects.  2-3 % of the $6.15 billion gives a cost range of between $123 million and $184 
million. 
Additionally, the VA’s total IT budget for 2007 was $1.26 billion.  The operations 
and maintenance portion of this budget is $555 million. Using the same 2 to 3 percent 
factor as explained above for the DoD, provides a range of $11 million to $16.5 million 
for the VA to implement the same SSN to MIN conversion.  Combining the DoD and VA 
figures brings the total conversion cost estimates to between $133 million and $200.5 
million. 
From the above cost estimation methods, the research has arrived at a low 
estimate of $73 million and a high estimate of $200.5 million for the costs of 
implementation.  For further analysis, a theoretical cash flow is needed.  To establish this 
cash flow, other IT projects were used as a basis for the major categories of implementing  
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a new IT system or conducting a major update to an existing system.  The flow of money 
through these categories and over the 10-year time frame is an estimate to show relevant 



















































































































































Table 3.   Low Estimate Cash Out-Flows (approx $73 million) 
 
The following cash flow represents the high estimate.  Instead of using of using 
the $200.5 million previously found, the following cash flow table was established by 
tripling the low estimate.  This estimate is 10 percent higher than the $200.5 million high 















































































































































Table 4.   High Estimate Cash Out-Flows (approx $219 million) 
 
3.   Efficient Market Hypothesis Method 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis, as developed by Professor Eugene Fame at the 
University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, states the financial markets 
governing public companies quickly reflect all known information that can affect the 
company.  This theory suggests that all of the financial losses to a company that 
experiences a data breach of privacy information will quickly be reflected in the stock 
price of the company.  According to the hypothesis, even the probabilities of the resulting 
financial losses would be accounted for in the market capitalization of the company. 
Several large, publicly traded financial companies have experienced major data 
breaches over the past several years.  In the research paper, “Quantifying the financial 
impact of IT security breaches,” Ashish Garg et al., show that the average market 
capitalization loss resulting from several theft events concerning credit card information 
was a -15% change in market cap.  (Garg et al., 2003) 
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Using various aspects of the size of the DoD, such as its $1.1 trillion in assets, its 
3.3 million military and civilian personnel and its $416 billion annual budget, (GAO, 
2004) the potential value of a DoD data loss can be estimated.  If you combine the VA 
and DoD budgets, they total approximately $490 billion.  By using this as a proxy for the 
“market capitalization” of the DoD, a significant data loss from DoD or the VA would 
equate to approximately a societal loss of $73.5 billion.  This efficient market hypothesis 
method shows that the cost estimate used in this research is actually a conservative one. 
C. BENEFITS 
Capital investment decisions are complex and often involve many non-
quantitative or qualitative factors that are difficult to fully capture in analysis.  Often an 
organization may go ahead with an investment because of political pressure or to 
accomplish social objectives that lie outside the profit motive.  In making capital 
investment decisions, private producers only consider producer surplus.  The Federal 
Government, on the other hand, is obligated to account for producers and consumers, the 
government and society as a whole.   
1. Cost Avoidance 
There are approximately 26.5 million veterans in the Veterans Administration 
system.  From the literature review, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 5835 would 
cost $5 million in 2007 and about $50 million over the 2007-2011 period ($10 million per 
year).  However, if the VA were to experience another data breach similar to the recent 
incident involving 17 million individuals, the cost could be as much as $1 billion.  The 
CBO estimated that the VA could be expected to experience an average of three incidents 
a year in which sensitive, personal information is compromised in some manner.  
Excluding the recent incident, the average number of people affected by a data breach has 
been about 50,000.  The expected cost of notification for groups this size would be 
approximately $500,000 a year.  CBO estimates that 10 to 15 percent of those whose 
information is compromised will experience a loss on the order of about $450.  Thus, 
CBO estimates that the cost to the VA would be about $10 million a year on average.  




a.   Interpolation Method  
Total societal financial loss estimates to business and individuals in 2006 
that are directly related to identity theft are $55 billion and $5 billion per respectively, in 
the United States alone (FTC 28 September 2004).  10 million people per year discover 
they are victims of identity theft.  This is 4.6 percent of the approximately 217,391,304 
United States adult population.  The DoD and VA combined account for 13.6 percent of 
the U.S. adult population.  (29,565,231/217,391,304=.136).  Researchers estimate that the 
amount of identity theft attributed to loss of records at work accounts for 3 percent of all 
identity thefts.  (Identity Theft:  The Aftermath 2004)  
For this research the 3 percent estimate has been revised up to 5 percent 
for the DoD/VA population because “work” comprises a relatively larger portion of the 
DoD employees’ life, i.e., health care, child care, Family Service Center, deployed 
mailing addresses, exchange, commissary, MWR, club systems, etc. which are all part of 
DoD/VA. 
The potential benefits derived from this estimation method are illustrated 
in Table 5, below. 
 
Benefit Category Benefit Elements Value (Tangible or 
Intangible) 
Financial loss to society 
avoided 
Individual and business 
financial loss 
$60 Bil/yr * 13.6% * 5%= 
$408 mil yr 
  
Financial loss to DoD and 
VA avoided 
Direct gov’t bailouts, 
ID theft Insurance, 
Credit check cost 
coverage 
$10 M * 2 = $20 mil yr 









b.  Second Estimation Method 
The CBO estimated that the cost for Veterans’ Affairs to meet the 
requirement to notify and provide credit watch for individuals due to information breach 
as stipulated in H.R. 5835, the Veterans’ Identity and Credit Security Act of 2006, to be 
the following: 
• $5 million for 2007 
• $50 million 2007-2011 ($10 million a year) 
• (However, if there were a breech similar to the most recent (17 million), 
the cost could be >$1 billion.) 
In making theses estimates, the CBO assumes that the VA will experience 
three breaches a year.  CBO estimates that the personal information of 50,000 people will 
be compromised per breech, and that 10-15% will experience a loss (become a victim of 
identity theft).  The average estimated loss would be approximately $450.  Using this 
data, the total individual loss per year is approximately $10,125,000, as shown below.   
• 50,000 people*15% loss rate = 7,500 people/breach  
• 7,500*3 breaches/yr = 22,500 people/yr 
• 22,500*$450 personal loss/person = $10,125,000 total personal loss/yr 
However, the analysis above DOES NOT account for losses to private 
businesses.  Private business absorb the vast majority of the financial losses associated 
with identity theft, so using a conservative estimate of a 10 to 1 ratio for costs (business 
to individual) it is estimated that the following business losses are experienced: 
• $10,125,000*10=$101,250,000 business loss/yr 
• $101,250,000 + $10,125,000 personal/yr = $111,375,000 total/yr 
This $111,375,000 figure represents the total annual losses attributable to 
identity theft associated with the VA alone.  Presuming the DoD follows a similar 
pattern, the costs to society would be $222,750,000 per year.    
Comparing this CBO based estimate with an estimate using 2004 figures 
from Identity Theft:  The Aftermath 2004 (IT 2004), it is possible that the calculation 




earnings and expenses, 5.9 times as large as the aforementioned $450.  To ensure a 
conservative estimate, the lower 10% loss experience rate was applied resulting in the 
following: 
• 50,000 people*10% loss rate = 5,000 people/breach 
• 5,000*3 breaches/yr = 15,000 people/yr 
• 15,000*$2,671 personal loss/person=$40,065,000 total personal loss/yr 
Using the same conservative estimate of a 10 to 1 ratio for costs (business 
to individual) it is estimated: 
• $40,065,000*10=$400,650,000 business loss/yr 
• $400,650,000+ $40,065,000 personal/yr =$440,715,000 total/yr 
These figures, represent the total annual losses associated with the VA 
alone.  Assuming the DoD follows a similar pattern, $881,430,000 per year is the total 
cost to society.   
The $408 million per year estimate, computed in the interpolation method, 
falls in the middle of this estimated range and appears reliable for use in the cost benefit 
analysis.   
2. Benefit Schedule 
Obviously the $408 million of annual indirect benefits (costs avoided) could not 
possibly be realized in the first year; therefore, an annual schedule of benefits must be 
calculated (See Table 6).  Additionally, the total costs must be allocated appropriately to 
the two organizations involved, the DoD and the VA. 
To estimate such a schedule, the $408 million is divided by the 29.5 million 
individuals comprising the DOD and VA system.  The result is $13,830,508 in annual 
costs per million individuals.  This figure is then multiplied by three to represent the total 
annual costs, $41,491,525, associated with the DoD.  It is also multiplied by 26.5 to 
illustrate the portion of total costs, $366,508,475, for which the VA is responsible.  In 
essence the total $408 million has been prorated across the two organizations.   
It is assumed that implementation of the conversion will be staggered.  For 
estimation purposes, calculations assume transition first at the DoD followed by the VA.   
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Period (Yr) DoD  
% Implemented 
$ Benefits VA % Implemented $ Benefits Total $ Benefits
      
1 0% $0 0% $0 $0
2 30% $12,447,458 0% $0 $12,447,458
3 60% $24,894,915 0% $0 $24,894,915
4 90% $37,342,373 0% $0 $37,342,373
5 99% $41,076,610 0% $0 $41,076,610
6 100% $41,491,525 0% $0 $41,491,525
7 100% $41,491,525 25% $91,627,119 $133,118,644
8 100% $41,491,525 50% $183,254,237 $224,745,763
9 100% $41,491,525 75% $274,881,356 $316,372,881
10 100% $41,491,525 100% $366,508,475 $408,000,000
Table 6.   Theoretical Implementation Schedule (Indirect Benefits) 
 
The direct benefits follow the same schedule, but are applied uniformly to the $20 
million ($10 million for each department) as recommended in the CBO study.  The 




















1 2,000,000 0 1 2,000,000 0 0 0 0 -2,000,000 
2 30,000,000 3,000,000 0.9346 28,037,383 2,803,738 12,447,458 11,633,138 14,436,876 -13,600,507 
3 6,000,000 6,000,000 0.8734 5,240,632 5,240,632 24,894,915 21,744,183 26,984,815 21,744,183 
4 6,180,000 9,000,000 0.8163 5,044,721 7,346,681 37,342,373 30,482,500 37,829,181 32,784,460 
5 6,365,400 9,900,000 0.7629 4,856,133 7,552,663 41,076,610 31,337,149 38,889,812 34,033,679 
6 2,616,013 10,000,000 0.7130 1,865,181 7,129,862 41,491,525 29,582,884 36,712,746 34,847,565 
7 23,974,800 12,500,000 0.6663 15,975,422 8,329,278 133,118,644 88,702,573 97,031,851 81,056,430 
8 5,569,858 15,000,000 0.6227 3,468,628 9,341,246 224,745,763 139,960,366 149,301,612 145,832,984 
9 5,736,954 17,500,000 0.5820 3,338,959 10,185,159 316,372,881 184,131,897 194,317,057 190,978,097 
10 5,909,063 20,000,000 0.5439 3,214,139 10,878,675 408,000,000 221,924,967 232,803,642 229,589,503 
Total 94,352,088 102,900,000  73,041,198 68,807,934   828,307,592 755,266,394 
Net 
Benefits     -4,233,264   755,266,394  



























1 6000000 0 1 6,000,000 0 0 0 0 -6,000,000
2 90000000 3,000,000 0.935 84,112,150 2,803,738 12,447,458 11,633,138 14,436,876 -69,675,273
3 18000000 6,000,000 0.873 15,721,897 5,240,632 24,894,915 21,744,183 26,984,815 11,262,918
4 18540000 9,000,000 0.816 15,134,163 7,346,681 37,342,373 30,482,500 37,829,181 22,695,018
5 19096200 9,900,000 0.763 14,568,400 7,552,663 41,076,610 31,337,149 38,889,812 24,321,412
6 7848000 10,000,000 0.713 5,595,516 7,129,862 41,491,525 29,582,884 36,712,746 31,117,230
7 71924400 12,500,000 0.666 47,926,265 8,329,278133,118,644 88,702,573 97,031,851 49,105,586
8 16710000 15,000,000 0.623 10,406,148 9,341,246224,745,763139,960,366 149,301,612138,895,464
9 17210000 17,500,000 0.582 10,016,377 10,185,159316,372,881184,131,897 194,317,057184,300,680
10 17727000 20,000,000 0.544 9,642,313 10,878,675408,000,000221,924,967 232,803,642223,161,328





   
Table 8.   High Estimate 
 
D. ANALYSIS 
For an analysis of long-term investments a variety of evaluation techniques must 
be considered.  The more popular of these include the following: 
• Payback period 
• Discounted payback period 
• Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR) 
• Net present value (NPV) 
• Internal rate of return (IRR)  
• Probabilistic Net Present Value (PNPV) 
These techniques provide the decision maker with the information to compare the 
proposed alternatives - maintaining the status quo versus implementing a conversion 
from SSN to MIN.  Additionally, these metrics are useful when comparing other, future 
alternatives of varying costs, size, time for implementation, etc. 
1. Payback Period 
The payback period measures the length of time required to recover the amount of 
initial investment.  Though it’s simple to calculate, it disregards the time value of money.  
To quantify the payback period, the cumulative benefits are considered to identify the  
 
55 
instant that the cumulative cash flow breaks even.  At this break-even point the initial 
investment is repaid.  Table 9 shows the figures previously discussed to provide a 
payback period analysis.  
 







1 2 0.0000 -2 -2 -73.0412 
2 30 15.4470 -14.553 -16.553 15.4470 
3 6 30.8940 24.894 8.341 30.8940 
4 6.18 46.3420 40.162 48.503 46.3420 
5 6.3654 50.9760 44.6106 93.1136 50.9760 
6 2.616013 51.4910 48.87499 141.9886 51.4910 
7 23.9748 145.6180 121.6432 263.6318 145.6180 
8 5.569858 239.7450 234.1751 497.8069 239.7450 
9 5.736954 333.8720 328.135 825.942 333.8720 
10 5.909063 428.0000 422.0909 1248.033 428.0000 
Table 9.   Payback Period Using Low Cost Estimates 
 
Since the cash inflows are not equal, the payback period is discovered based on 
trial and error.  Using $73.04 million as the total up front cost of the project and 
observing cash inflows, the following total break-even point is derived: 
$73.04 M = 3 + ((73.04M- ($15.447M + $30.894M)) / $46.342M) = 3.57 yrs 
 





1 6 0.0000 -6 -6 -219.1236 
2 90 15.4470 -74.553 -80.553 15.4470 
3 18 30.8940 12.894 -67.659 30.8940 
4 18.54 46.3420 27.802 -39.857 46.3420 
5 19.0962 50.9760 31.8798 -7.9772 50.9760 
6 7.848039 51.4910 43.64296 35.66576 51.4910 
7 71.9244 145.6180 73.6936 109.3594 145.6180 
8 16.70958 239.7450 223.0354 332.3948 239.7450 
9 17.21086 333.8720 316.6611 649.0559 333.8720 
10 17.72719 428.0000 410.2728 1059.329 428.0000 






Using the same logic with the higher cost estimate of $219M (See Table 10) the 
following total break-even point is determined: 
$219.1236 M = 6 + ($23.97M / $145.618M) = 6.16 yrs 
When using payback period as an evaluative tool, the decision rule is to choose 
the project with the shorter payback period.  The shorter the payback period the less risky 
the project, in part due to the greater liquidity afforded the organization. 
The payback period method for evaluating an investment project is simple to 
compute and easy to understand.  However, it does not recognize the time value of 
money and ignores the impact of continued returns after the payback period.  These 
continued cost savings are exactly the returns the research is examining.   
2.  Discounted Payback Period 
The discounted payback period takes into account the time value of money.  Time 
value of money is a critical consideration in financial and investment decisions.  
Discounting is used to evaluate the future cash flows associated with capital budgeting 
projects to determine its present value (PV).  PV is the present worth of future sums of 
money.   
The discount rate, more commonly called the opportunity cost of capital, is the 
minimum rate of return required by the investor.  The PV of a series of mixed payments 
(deferred costs) is the sum of the PV of each individual payment.  The discounted 
payback period, therefore, is computed by adding the PV of each period’s benefits until 









1 2 0.0000 -2 -2 
2 28.03738 14.4370 -13.6004 -15.6004 
3 5.240632 26.9850 21.74437 6.143984 
4 5.044721 37.8290 32.78428 38.92826 
5 4.856133 38.8890 34.03287 72.96113 
6 1.865181 36.7130 34.84782 107.8089 
7 15.97542 97.0320 81.05658 188.8655 
8 3.468628 149.3010 145.8324 334.6979 
9 3.33896 194.3170 190.978 525.6759 
10 3.214139 232.8040 229.5899 755.2658 
Table 11.   Discounted Payback Period Using Low Cost Estimates 
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Since the discounted cash inflows are not equal, the payback period is discovered 
based on trial and error.  Using $73.04M as the present value of the costs over the life of 
the project and observing discounted cumulative cash inflows (see Table 11) the 
following total break-even point is derived: 
$73.04 M = 3 + (($73.04M-($14.437M + $26.985M)) / $37.829 M) = 3.836 yrs 
Table 10 also illustrates that discounted cash flow becomes positive in year three, 
with a cumulative cash flow break even at 2.717 yrs. 









1 6 0.0000 -6 -6 
2 84.11215 14.4370 -69.6751 -75.6751 
3 15.7219 26.9850 11.2631 -64.412 
4 15.13416 37.8290 22.69484 -41.7172 
5 14.5684 38.8890 24.3206 -17.3966 
6 5.595544 36.7130 31.11746 13.72085 
7 47.92627 97.0320 49.10573 62.82658 
8 10.40588 149.3010 138.8951 201.7217 
9 10.01688 194.3170 184.3001 386.0218 
10 9.642416 232.8040 223.1616 609.1834 
Table 12.   Discounted Payback Period Using High Cost Estimates 
 
Using the same logic with the higher cost estimate of $219M (See Table 12) 
yields the following total break-even point: 
$219.1236 M = 6 + ($64.2706M / $97.03M) = 6.662 yrs 
Again, discounted cash flow is positive in year three; however, discounted 
cumulative cash flow does not break even until 5.559 yrs.  
5 + ($17.3966 M / $31.117 M) = 5.559 yrs 
3. Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR) 
The BCR, also called the profitability index, is the ratio of the total PV of future 
cash inflows to the initial investment, (PV/I).  This index ranks projects in descending 
order of attractiveness.  If the BCR is greater than 1, then accept the project, for example, 
if the index equals 1.50, then this project generates $1.50 for each dollar invested, time 
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adjusted.  The greatest advantage of the BCR is that it compares all projects on the same 
relative basis regardless of size.  The index is widely used to rank projects that compete 
for limited funds.   
As shown in Table 13, with a PV of benefits estimated at $828.307 million over 
the ten-year period, the profitability index is 11.34.   
828.307 / 73.04 = 11.34 
Similarly, Table 14 depicts an index of 3.78, over the same time period using the 
higher cost estimate.   
828.307 / 219.1236 = 3.78 






1 2,000,000 0 0.0000
2 30,037,383 14,436,876 0.4806
3 35,278,016 41,421,692 1.1742
4 40,322,736 79,250,872 1.9654
5 45,178,870 118,140,684 2.6150
6 47,044,051 154,853,430 3.2917
7 63,019,472 251,885,281 3.9969
8 66,488,100 401,186,893 6.0340
9 69,827,059 595,503,950 8.5283
10 73,041,198 828,307,592 11.3403
Table 13.   BCR Using Low Cost Estimates 
 






1 6,000,000 0 0.0000
2 90,112,150 14,436,876 0.1602
3 105,834,047 41,421,692 0.3914
4 120,968,209 79,250,872 0.6551
5 135,536,609 118,140,684 0.8717
6 141,132,124 154,853,430 1.0972
7 189,058,389 251,885,281 1.3323
8 199,464,537 401,186,893 2.0113
9 209,480,914 595,503,950 2.8428
10 219,123,227 828,307,592 3.7801





Though this technique is straight-forward it does have a disadvantage in that it 
only considers the relative magnitude of net benefits.  Therefore, the BCR may favor 
projects with lower costs and benefits over those with greater net benefits, depending on 
their relative magnitudes.  
4. Net Present Value (NPV)  
The NPV and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) are called discounted cash flow 
(DCF) methods.  Both consider the time value of money in addition to estimated future 
cash flows.  Starting with a given amount invested today, NPV looks forward in time to 
determine the amount of future returns (costs avoided) needed to satisfy the cost-of-
capital requirements of the organization.  (OMB Circular 94 requires an ROE of 7 
percent.)  The present value of an investment is found by discounting such future returns.  
This figure is the most a business should be willing to invest in order to receive future 
returns from the investment.   
The NPV is the excess of the PV of cash inflows (costs avoided) generated by the 
project less the initial investment -  (I):  NPV=PV-I.   
The capital recovery portion of the cash return is very important to understand.  
NPV discounts all cash flows at the cost of capital, thus implicitly assuming that these 
cash flows can be reinvested at this rate.  This allows for decision makers to plan ahead 
for the capital recovery from the project to ensure the 7 percent ROE is met.  
 
Period Out In Cumulative
1 2 0.0000 -73.0412
2 30 15.4470 15.4470
3 6 30.8940 30.8940
4 6.18 46.3420 46.3420
5 6.3654 50.9760 50.9760
6 2.616013 51.4910 51.4910
7 23.9748 145.6180 145.6180
8 5.569858 239.7450 239.7450
9 5.736954 333.8720 333.8720
10 5.909063 428.0000 428.0000
Table 15.   NPV Using Low Cost Estimates 
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From the figures in Table 15 the NPV of the ten year period is $701.07M. Using 
the higher cost estimates of Table 16, the NPV is $554.99M over the same ten year 
period.  
 
per Out in Cumulative
1 6 0.0000 -219.1236
2 90 15.4470 15.4470
3 18 30.8940 30.8940
4 18.54 46.3420 46.3420
5 19.0962 50.9760 50.9760
6 7.848039 51.4910 51.4910
7 71.9244 145.6180 145.6180
8 16.70958 239.7450 239.7450
9 17.21086 333.8720 333.8720
10 17.72719 428.0000 428.0000
Table 16.   NPV Using High Cost Estimates 
 
The decision rule is that if NPV is positive, accept the project; otherwise reject it. 
Additionally, the NPV provides more accurate ranking of alternatives since the cost of 
capital is a more realistic reinvestment rate, an advantage it holds over the IRR.  
5.   Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
The IRR, also called the time-adjusted rate of return, is defined as the rate of 
interest that equates the investment (I) with the PV of future cash inflows.  It is the 
precise discount rate that yields a zero NPV.  Higher IRRs are preferable to lower IRRs 
assuming the IRR is higher than the hurdle rate.   
Applying the formula to the figures in Table 15, the IRR over the ten-year period 
is 62%.  Using the higher cost figures of Table 16, the IRR over the same ten-year period 
is 31%.  
The decision rule here is to accept the project with the highest IRR that exceeds 
the cost of capital; otherwise reject it.   
The advantage of using the IRR method is that it considers the time value of 
money; however, like the BCR, it fails to recognize the varying sizes of investment in 
competing projects.  Its largest drawback is that it implies a reinvestment rate at IRR.  
Thus, the implied reinvestment rate will differ from project to project. 
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6.   Probabilistic NPV  
As stated earlier, the NPV is the excess of the PV of cash inflows (costs avoided) 
generated by the project less the initial investment.  To consider the NPV in a more 
realistic fashion a probability spreadsheet was developed using the Crystal Ball software.  
Crystal Ball uses Monte Carlo simulation to assist in decision analysis.  The software 
enables the analyst to define probability distributions on uncertain model variables and 
then use the simulation to generate random values from within the defined probability 
ranges.  The outcome is a probability-based spreadsheet illustrating a more convincing 
Net Present Value (NPV).   
For simulation purposes, the following variables were used:  present value of the 
cash flow, implementation cost, and the discount rate.  The probability distributions are 
referred to as “assumptions” and used to define the uncertainty.  The assumptions are 
based on this research, intuition, and the desire to maintain conservative estimations.   
Additionally, for this analysis, it is assumed that a triangular distribution best fits 
the present value of the benefits and costs associated with a conversion from the SSN to a 
MIN.  Triangular distributions are ideal for describing basic situations where the 
minimum, likeliest, and maximum values are somewhat known.   
To calculate the minimum PV of benefits, the low benefit figure taken from the 
CBO’s figures of $222,750,000 was used by applying our benefit schedule.  For the 
maximum and most likely PV of benefits the larger figure of $408,000,000 was run 
through the benefit schedule.  For costs, the same triangular distribution principle was 
applied using $73,000,000 as a minimum and $219,000,000 as a maximum.  However, a 
more conservative estimate of $200,000,000 was chosen as the most likely amount (See 







Period Minimum Likeliest Maximum Mean in simulation 
PV Period 1 0 0 0 0 
PV Period 2 8.4400 15.4470 15.5000 13.1633 
PV Period 3 16.8600 30.8940 30.9000 26.2770 
PV Period 4 25.3000 46.3420 46.3500 39.4795 
PV Period 5 27.8000 50.9760 50.9800 42.9744 
PV Period 6 28.1100 51.4910 51.5000 43.6752 
PV Period 7 79.5000 145.6180 145.6200 123.4649 
PV Period 8 130.9000 239.7450 239.7500 203.2803 
PV Period 9 182.2800 333.8720 333.8800 283.5487 
PV Period 10 233.6000 428.0000 428.0100 362.8702 
PV of Costs 73.00 200.00 219.00 164.41 
Table 17.   Assumptions for Low Estimate Method 
(Figures are in millions of dollars, assumes a 7% discount rate, and a triangular distribution for all benefit 
and cost figures) 
Crystal Ball software was then used to calculate the probable net present value 
(PNPV).  A Monte Carlo simulation of two thousand trials was run, randomly selecting 















$350.00 $418.75 $487.50 $556.25 $625.00
2,000 Trials    3 Outliers
Forecast: Probable NPV
 
Figure 6.   Probable NPV Distribution Low Estimate 
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Based upon these findings, there is a 95 percent degree of confidence that the true 
mean of the NPV population falls somewhere between $397.74 and $584.18 million 










Coeff. of Variability 0.10 
Range Minimum $351.47 
Range Maximum $647.14 
Range Width $295.66 
Mean Std. Error $1.05 
Table 18.   Summary Statistics Low Estimate 
 
Cumulative Chart










$350.00 $418.75 $487.50 $556.25 $625.00
2,000 Trials    3 Outliers
Forecast: Probable NPV
 
Figure 7.   Cumulative Probable NPV, Low Estimate 
 
Figure 7 above shows the simulation output indicates that 95.25 percent of the 
time, the NPV, with a 7 percent discount cash rate, varying implementation costs and 
cash flows, is above $415 million.   
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A second analysis was performed assuming triangular distributions centering on 
the total benefits from the benefit schedule.  To calculate the minimum PV of benefits 
low benefit figure of $222,750,000 was used once again.  For the maximum value the 
larger benefit figure of $881,430,000, taken from calculations using the 2004 figures 
from Identity Theft:  The Aftermath 2004 (IT 2004), was applied.  The benefit schedule 
based on the $408,000,000 figure was used for the most likely outcome.  
Crystal Ball software was then used to calculate the probable net present value 
(PNPV).  A Monte Carlo simulation of one thousand trials was run, randomly selecting 
numbers from the assigned distribution.  The results are shown in Table 19 and Figures 8 
thru 10:  
 
Statistic Value ($ in millions) 
Trials  1,000 
Mean  $804.79 
Median  $799.48 
Standard Deviation  $121.55 
Variance  $14,774.94 
Skewness  0.20 
Kurtosis  2.81 
Coeff. of Variability  0.15 
Range Minimum  $441.53 
Range Maximum  $1,158.39 
Range Width  $716.86 
Mean Std. Error $3.84 




Figure 8.   Cumulative Probable NPV, High Estimate 
 
Based upon these findings there is a 95 percent degree of confidence that the true 
mean of the population falls somewhere between $610.67 and $1,121.70 million dollars. 
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Figure 9.   Reverse Cumulative Probable NPV, High Estimate 
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Figure 10.   Probable NPV Distribution Low Estimate 
 
By referencing Figures 8 through 10 and Table 19, the data shows that, for the 
low estimate, at the 95 percent confidence level the true mean of the NPV population 
falls between $397,740,000 and $584,180,000, with a mean of $492,290,000.  Looking at 
the high estimate, at the 95 percent confidence level the true mean of the NPV population 
falls between $610,670,000 and $1,121,700,000, with a mean of $804,790,000. 
 


























Low Cost 3.57 yrs 3.836 yrs 11.34 $701.07M 62% $804.79  
(High Benefit) 
High Cost 6.16 yrs 6.662 yrs 3.78 $554.99M 31% $492.29  
(Low Benefit) 
Table 20.   CBA Summary Table 
 
Table 20 is the compilation of the metrics from the previous section.  It indicates 
that, given the assumptions made throughout the cost/benefit analysis, the following can 
be assumed about a conversion from SSN to a MIN: 
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• The Payback period figures show that the benefits will begin to exceed the 
costs somewhere between 3.57 and 6.16 years, and between 3.836 and 
6.662 years when the benefits are discounted.   
• For every dollar invested in the conversion the return will be between 
$3.78 and $11.34 over the ten year period considered.   
• The internal rate of return lies in the 31 to 62 percent range.   
• The NPV is between $554.99 and $701.07 million, or $492.29 and 
$804.79 million when risk adjusting probability distributions are applied.   
These metrics provide the decision maker tools by which other alternatives can be 
measured and ranked.  
 
The combined cost and benefit are graphically illustrated below in Figures 11 thru 
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Figure 14.   Cumulative Present Value of Cost and Benefits, High Cost Estimates 
 
F.   SECONDARY EFFECTS (INDIRECT BENEFITS) 
The occurrences of identity theft that are averted by switching the DoD and VA 
over to a MIN will have spillover effects in productivity. 
1.   Morale Benefits 
Identity theft is a valid concern to Department of Defense and Veterans’ 
Administration employees.  The SSN is used and disseminated far too frequently.  For 
instance, every time a member undergoes a Permanent Change of Station, (PCS), copies 
of the PCS orders and Military ID cards are copied numerous times.  The check-out and 
check-in procedures at the old and new commands require copies of both the PCS orders 
and ID cards.  Each item clearly displays the employee/service member’s SSN.  The 
probability of becoming a victim of identity theft would be greatly reduced if the DoD 
employee (both military and civilian members) were assigned a MIN.  These individuals 
would worry less about ID theft, thus increasing morale. 
2.   Time Savings 
The average amount of time that a victim of identity theft spends, correcting 
records and dealing with the repercussions, is thirty hours.  It is reasonable to assume that 
the majority of this time is spent during working hours.  This lost time on the job is 
eliminated by switching to a MIN as the primary personal identifier within DoD and the 
VA.  
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3. Productivity Gains from Unrestricted Use of Identification Number 
The SSN “functionality creep” is due to increased productivity inherent in having 
a widely accessible, unique personal identifier.  As various technology security measures 
(such as encryption) and policy restrictions which limit the use and display of the SSN 
have been initiated, the usefulness of the identifier has diminished.  Conversion to a MIN 
would increase productivity recently lost as these various measures to prevent identity 
theft have been implemented.  Since a loss or breach of the MIN will have no value to an 
identity thief, the identification can be freely used without use restrictions, display 
restrictions, or technology security measures.  Organizations could once again produce 
rosters with an identification number.  Additionally, the MIN itself can hold meaning by 
assigning the numbers based on some unique sequence.  Even researchers, such as the 
manpower students at the Naval Postgraduate School will be more productive since they 
would no longer have to deal with encrypted data files and restrictive usage policies. 
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VI. SUMMARY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. IDENTITY THEFT IN THE U. S. AND U.S. MILITARY 
Identity theft in the U.S. has quickly become one of the largest categories of crime 
in the U.S. and is a tremendous financial strain on the U.S. economy.  The widespread 
and growing reliance on SSNs as an identifier is the primary cause for the increase in 
identity theft.  Identity theft costs the U.S. economy approximately $56.6 billion per year 
and the average time spent by an identity theft victim seeking resolution increased to 
about 40 hours in 2006.   
The military is more susceptible to identity theft than the U.S. public at large due 
to the prolific use of SSNs for purposes other than those associated with the Social 
Security Administration.  Use of the SSN as a personal identifier has become so 
pervasive that nearly every organization within the DoD uses it.  It is estimated that the 
SSN is used in approximately 1000 major computer systems and databases.  In reality 
there are many more, smaller, independent systems that use SSNs that have not even been 
reported or tracked. 
B. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF A CONVERSION TO A MIN 
By applying two methods - Y2K as a proxy and the Budget method - to determine 
the costs associated with converting the DoD and VA from use of the SSN as a personal 
identifier to use of the MIN, the total costs range from $73,000,000 to $200,500,000. 
Using an interpolation of national figures then comparing them to figures 
provided by both the CBO and Identity Theft:  The Aftermath 2004 (IT 2004), annual 
benefits after conversion range from $222,750,000 to $881,430,000.  However, the figure 
most likely centers around $408,000,000. 
The following methodologies were used as part of the analysis: 
• Payback period 
• Discounted payback period 
• Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR) 
• Net present value (NPV) 
• Internal rate of return (IRR)  



























Low Cost 3.57 yrs 3.836 yrs 11.34 $701.07M 62% $804.79  
(High Benefit) 
High Cost 6.16 yrs 6.662 yrs 3.78 $554.99M 31% $492.29  
(Low Benefit) 
Table 21.   CBA Summary Table 
 
The results, summarized in Table 21, show the decision maker that, given the 
assumptions made throughout the cost/benefit analysis, the following exist: 
• The Payback period figures show that the benefits will begin to exceed the 
costs somewhere between 3.57 and 6.16 years, and between 3.836 and 
6.662 years when the benefits are discounted.   
• Every dollar invested in the conversion will return between $3.78 and 
$11.34 over the ten year period considered.   
• The internal rate of return lies in the 31 to 62 percent range.   
• The NPV is between $554.99 and $701.07 million, or $492.29 and 
$804.79 million when risk adjusting probability distributions are applied.   
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that further research be undertaken to identify and/or perform 
the following: 
• Viable alternatives and solutions to secure military, civilian and veterans’ 
personal identities.    
• The Costs and benefits associated with these alternatives and solutions be 
reviewed. 
• Conduct cost to benefit analysis to derive the same Cost/Benefit metrics 
found in this work for comparison. 
Upon completion all research results should be compiled and provided to the 
appropriate decision makers.  These metrics should provide the tools by which other 
alternatives can be measured, prioritized, and ranked. 
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